An expert witness reference
Retaining and Working With an Expert

What to Send an Expert in the First Email

Everything in the first message is either a fact the other side may read later or a reason the candidate cannot be used

The first message is a discovery event before it is a hiring decision

An approach to an expert candidate feels like correspondence and behaves like disclosure. If the candidate is retained and testifies, the material sent in that first exchange is capable of becoming part of what FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(ii) calls the facts or data considered by the witness in forming the opinions, and the 2010 Advisory Committee Note reads that phrase as reaching any material considered by the expert, from whatever source, that contains factual ingredients — expressly “not only those relied upon by the expert.” If the candidate is not retained, the same material may be the thing that disqualifies them from working for the other side, or that gets the party accused of having tried to.

Neither of those consequences is a reason to be cagey. A candidate who is given nothing cannot say whether the question is answerable, whether it is in their field, or whether they are free to take it, and a screening call built on evasion wastes the one hour that was worth having. The point is narrower: the first message should contain everything the candidate needs to answer and nothing that has to be un-sent later.

That distinction is doing real work, because the two categories are not the same as confidential and public. A great deal of case-specific material is not privileged at all and is still the wrong thing to send on day one, and a great deal of what a candidate needs — forum, posture, schedule, the shape of the record — carries no confidentiality at all.

The conflict check comes before the facts, not after the enthusiasm

The first substantive request is not about the case. It is a list: the parties in the caption, their corporate parents, subsidiaries and affiliates, any insurers or indemnitors, all counsel of record, and the product, facility, patent or transaction at issue. The candidate is asked to check that list against their own employers, consulting clients, board seats and prior retentions, and to say so before anything else is discussed.

The reason is the disqualification test in Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991), which asks whether it was objectively reasonable for a party to conclude that a confidential relationship existed and whether confidential or privileged information was actually disclosed to the consultant. Both must be answered yes before disqualification follows. Running the check first keeps a candidate who turns out to be conflicted from ever reaching the second question, and it keeps the retaining party out of the argument that it made contact for the purpose of taking the candidate off the board.

The check is also the moment to establish that it is continuing. Model retention language in the ABA’s litigation materials requires the expert to notify counsel immediately of a later-arising conflict or of a subpoena in another matter. A conflict that surfaces in month two is a nuisance; the same conflict surfacing after the Rule 26(a)(2) deadline can leave a party with no disclosed expert and no time to disclose one, and whether any relief follows is a question about the scheduling order rather than about the conflict doctrine.

What a candidate needs in order to answer at all

Six things make the difference between a useful reply and a polite one.

  • The forum and the posture. Which court, which stage, whether the case is in discovery or past it, and whether the expert would be opening or responding to an existing report.
  • The question, stated as a question. Not the subject area and not the desired answer — the thing the opinion would have to establish, phrased so that “no” is a possible response.
  • The role. Consulting or testifying, and whether that is settled or being decided.
  • The record. What exists, roughly how much of it, what format it is in, and what has not been produced yet. Volume and format drive the hours far more than the question does.
  • The dates. The disclosure deadline, the discovery cutoff and the trial setting, taken from the scheduling order rather than from the defaults in FRCP 26(a)(2)(D), which apply only absent a stipulation or court order and rarely control in a litigated case.
  • Whether an opposing expert has been disclosed, and if so, on what.

None of that requires a document to be attached. All of it can be written in a page, and a candidate who cannot say anything useful in response to that page is unlikely to say anything more useful in response to the file.

What not to attach, and why the reason is a rule rather than etiquette

Before a conflict check clears, nothing privileged, nothing confidential and nothing case-specific that a stranger has no business holding. That includes the internal assessment memo, the mediation statement, the client’s own account of what happened, and material produced under a protective order that no one has yet been added to.

After it clears, the constraint changes character. It stops being about confidentiality and becomes about the record the engagement is building. Everything sent to a candidate who is later retained and disclosed is capable of being enumerated as material considered, and the disclosure obligation reaches material that was read and set aside as surely as material that was used. A file dumped on a candidate in week one to help them get up to speed is a file the candidate has considered.

The practical version is a sequence rather than a prohibition. Send the summary that lets the candidate assess fit. After the conflict check and the engagement letter, send materials deliberately, in an order that reflects what the analysis actually requires, with a record of what went out and when. That costs nothing at the time and answers the deposition question — what were you given, by whom, and when — with a list instead of a search.

Assumptions travel differently from facts

There is a distinction inside FRCP 26(b)(4)(C) that is worth understanding before the first email rather than after the deposition. The rule protects attorney–expert communications as work product, with three exceptions: communications that relate to compensation; that identify facts or data the attorney provided and the expert considered; and that identify assumptions the attorney provided and the expert relied on.

The verbs are different on purpose. Attorney-supplied facts come out on the broader standard — considering them is enough. Attorney-supplied assumptions come out only on the narrower one, if the expert actually relied on them. And both exceptions are framed as reaching the communication only “to the extent that” it identifies the fact or the assumption; the rest of the message does not become discoverable because part of it did.

What that means for a first email is not that assumptions should be hidden. It is that an assumption should be recognizable as an assumption when it is written. A message that says the expert should assume the shipment left on the fourth, and that says so in terms, produces a clean answer at deposition. A message that asserts the same thing as fact in the middle of a narrative produces an argument about which category it was in, conducted by someone reading the sentence aloud.

Naming the designation in the message that creates it

The engagement letter states whether the expert is retained as a consulting or a testifying expert, but the first email is usually where the relationship is actually characterized, and the two should not disagree. A candidate approached about writing a report and then engaged as a consultant, or the reverse, has a document trail that describes two different roles.

The stakes are set by FRCP 26(b)(4)(D): facts known and opinions held by an expert retained in anticipation of litigation who is not expected to testify are ordinarily beyond discovery, absent Rule 35(b) or a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. That is the strongest protection in the expert rules, and it exists so that a party can learn what the evidence supports before deciding whether to put it in front of a jury.

Where the case may need both roles, the cleanest arrangement is two people. Practitioner materials describe running both through the same firm as playing with fire, because a testifying expert’s exposure to consulting work product puts that material at risk. Deciding it in the first exchange costs one sentence. Deciding it in month six costs the option.

What to ask the candidate to send back

The reply request is short, and three of its four items are things the rule will demand anyway. FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) requires a report to contain the witness’s qualifications including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years, a list of all other cases in which the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition during the previous 4 years, and a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. Asking for all three at the outset is not aggressive; it is asking for the disclosure early.

The fourth item is availability measured against the actual dates: the report deadline, the deposition window, and the trial setting. It is the question most often asked last and the one most likely to end the conversation.

What comes back is itself evidence. The four-year list is a floor rather than a ceiling, and the ABA chapter on selecting an expert is explicit that counsel should look further back than the rule requires. A candidate who supplies the list without being chased has kept records; a candidate who supplies a CV that does not match the one attached to a filing from three years ago has supplied the cheapest red flag available. And a search that turns up no prior exclusion is weak evidence of nothing in particular — most rulings under Rule 702 are made from the bench or in unpublished orders and never become searchable text.

Reading the reply, including the parts that sound unhelpful

The most informative answer to a first email is usually a refusal of some kind. An expert who says the question sits outside their field, that the data described will not support an opinion to a reasonable degree of certainty, that they would need to see a particular record before saying anything, or that the answer may come back unhelpful, has disclosed more about how they work than any listing or CV can.

The opposite is also information. A candidate who arrives at the retaining party’s preferred conclusion during the first conversation, on a description of the facts written by the party’s own lawyer, has demonstrated the thing that opposing counsel will spend a deposition establishing. It does not make the opinion wrong. It makes the sequence in which the opinion was formed a subject of cross-examination, and that sequence is now documented in an email.

Testimony history cuts in both directions, and roughly symmetrically. A candidate with a long deposition record will not be rattled, will recognize a Rule 702 motion when it arrives and will not say anything reckless in the first hour — and has transcripts in circulation, an income visibly concentrated in litigation work and, in at least some courts, an obligation to quantify exactly how concentrated. Behler v. Hanlon, 199 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 2001), ordered disclosure of the share of the expert’s gross income from expert work over five years, a five-year case list, and a ten-year list of retaining insurers. A candidate with no history carries no impeachment file and no track record either. There is no safe position on that axis, only a choice about which cross-examination is easier to sit through.

What the exchange becomes if the engagement happens

Assume the first email is read aloud. Not because anything in it is improper, but because the ordinary machinery of expert discovery makes it available: the compensation exception in FRCP 26(b)(4)(C)(i), the disclosure of facts or data considered under FRCP 26(a)(2)(B)(ii), and the fact that the expert’s own notes of the exchange are treated by the weight of reported district authority as neither a draft nor an attorney communication and therefore as outside the 2010 protections entirely.

Two habits follow. The first is preservation rather than curation, which is the posture recommended in ABA materials: keep the correspondence, keep the transmittal records, keep the notes. It is better to preserve material and litigate whether it is discoverable than to explain the absence of something that plainly existed. The second is that the exchange should read the way the engagement is meant to run — a question posed, a scope described, a schedule stated, an assumption labelled as an assumption.

None of this makes the first email a formal document. It makes it the first page of the file, written by the person who will be asked about it last.

Frequently Asked Questions

What should the first email to an expert witness actually contain?

The forum and procedural posture, the question the opinion would have to answer, whether the role is consulting or testifying, a description of the record and its volume and format, the dates from the scheduling order, and whether an opposing expert has been disclosed. Alongside that, the conflict list: parties, parents and subsidiaries, insurers, counsel of record and the product or transaction at issue. That is enough for a candidate to say whether the question is in their field, whether it is answerable on the record described, and whether they are free to take it.

Can privileged documents be sent to an expert before the engagement letter is signed?

They should not be, and the reason is practical as well as doctrinal. Until the conflict check clears, the candidate may turn out to be conflicted, and material sent in the interim is exactly what the second prong of the Wang test asks about — whether confidential or privileged information was actually disclosed. After the check clears and terms are agreed, materials can be sent deliberately, with a record of what went out and when, because everything a testifying expert receives is capable of being enumerated later as facts or data considered.

Does a first email to an expert become discoverable?

It may. Communications between a party’s attorney and a witness required to provide a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report receive work-product protection under Rule 26(b)(4)(C), but the protection is qualified and carries three exceptions: compensation, attorney-supplied facts or data the expert considered, and attorney-supplied assumptions the expert relied on. The expert’s own notes of the exchange are generally treated as outside the protection altogether, being neither drafts nor attorney communications, and several states never adopted the 2010 federal protections.

Should the desired conclusion be stated when approaching an expert?

The question should be stated; the answer should not. A candidate who is told what the party needs and agrees to it in the first conversation has created a sequence — conclusion first, analysis afterward — that opposing counsel will reconstruct from the correspondence. Assumptions are a different matter and can properly be supplied, provided they are written as assumptions rather than asserted as facts. Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(iii) makes attorney-supplied assumptions discoverable to the extent the expert relied on them, so labelling them is the safer practice.

What should an expert be asked to provide in reply?

A current CV with the publication record, a list of cases in which the candidate testified at trial or by deposition in the previous four years, the compensation structure, and concrete availability measured against the report deadline, deposition window and trial setting. The first three are contents the report will have to carry under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) in any event, so asking early only moves the work forward. The fourth is the one most often left until last and the one most likely to end the discussion.

Is a single phone call enough to disqualify an expert from working for the other side?

Generally not, on the two-part test from Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va. 1991). The court asks whether a confidential relationship was objectively reasonable to assume and whether confidential information actually passed; both must be answered yes. Courts look at whether there was a written agreement, whether documents were sent, whether a fee was paid, how many communications occurred and whether the expert formed an opinion. The test is built that way deliberately, to prevent parties from tying up a field’s available experts by making token contact.
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